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Patrick Dunleavy reviews a fascinating, but flawed, history of democratic thinking from an
American perspective. It throws often unexpected light on democratic innovations through
the ages; and if the government’s project to slice the UK electorate up into equal
constituencies is your bag, you can get stuck in here.
George G. Szpiro, Numbers Rule: The Vexing Mathematics of Democracy, from Plato to the
Present, Princeton University Press, 2010.
What is it about Americans and democracy? OK we know that the US is today’s
Rome, spending half the world’s military budget and still bestriding international
policy like a colossus. And OK too, many of today’s 300 million Americans have
much the same appalling ethno-centrism as the people of any imperial power in
full bloom (like Edwardian England). But does George G. Szpiro have to be
quite so transparently Victorianand revisionist in producing a book whose
hidden but deeply felt sub-title should beThe United States as the Pinnacle of
Democracy?
A book that starts out as an elegant, well-written and thought-provoking
discussion of the problems of representing democratically a mass of voters’
diverse and complex views becomes sidetracked into a tiny backwater about
‘apportionment’ problems, so boring that your toes curl. Szpiro begins with the
ancient Greeks and a full-spectrum discussion of democracy, yet he ends up for
much of the last third of the book obsessed with largely irrelevant maths cake-
cutting problems.
Let’s start with what works well first though, which is the kind of Plato to NATO thread that runs for much of
the book, starting with the Greek sage himself and ending up with Kenneth Arrow at the height of the cold
war. Szpiro has a nice approach to shedding new and interesting light on what might otherwise have seemed
a familiar story about innovations in democratic thinking and solution-finding. His first key trick is to
personalise issues and breakthroughs in his sub-title theme of ‘The vexing mathematics of democracy’, by
fixing a clear spotlight on some key thinkers.
Giving a clear narrative about each of his key figures, Szpiro successfully shows how knotty many problems
of representation actually are until they are solved. He gives readers valuable biographical notes and
context about each person discussed, full of details and incidents that sweeten the pill of absorbing some
useful maths thinking and technical knowledge. The personalisation is also summed up in an often useful
chapter heading that synoptically characterizes the author involved.
Szpiro’s second key contribution is to introduce some new and surprising characters into the over-time story.
Plato himself (summarised as ‘The Anti-Democrat’) is an interesting choice to start from, since his Republic is
chiefly known as the denial of any democracy in favour of (allegedly) enlightened technocratic rule.  In fact
Szpiro shows that Plato tackled interesting problems about how many guardians to have, and how they would
make collective decisions, as well as requiring elections for choosing many less important office-holders in
city life.
With a quick diversion discussing Pliny in Roman times (not sure why), Szpiro skips forward to Ramon Llul
(‘The Mystic’), a thirteenth century Spanish intellectual who had a major influence on Liebniz and Newton but
whose name will be unfamiliar to most British readers. Llul was obsessed with binary numbers and choices
and he devised two interesting methods for choosing office holders from a large field of candidates through
what we would now call ‘pair-wise comparison’.
Szpiro’s next port of call is the early fifteenth century cardinal, Niklaus Causanus, who discussed in forensic
detail the key election of his times and of many previous centuries, namely how to choose the Pope in the
College of Cardinals – which uses exhaustive balloting and the ultimate voting threshold, i.e., complete
unanimity. Not surprisingly one of the key drivers for getting to a decision was in fact exhausting the voters,
plus organising side-payments of offices and benefits to persuade the recalcitrant.
Szpiro does not bring out fully the broader message behind the Llul and Causanus stories, namely that it
was largely in the unlikely setting of the Catholic church that the knowledge and practice of elections as
means for choosing leaders in abbeys and convents survived for many hundreds of years. This story was
recently reconstructed by two scholars, Ian McLean in Britain (whom Szpiro has read) and Josep Colomer in
Spain (whom he hasn’t).
From just before the Reformation the book skips across the era of European absolute monarchies to the late
eighteenth century to cover the more familiar story of Charles Borda and Nicolas Condorcet and the
founding fathers of the American republic. Szpiro adds in a discussion of the eminent mathematician, Pierre
de Simon Laplace, who made big contributions in probability but whose input discussed here seems fairly
small. From there by way of Charles Dodgson (aka Lewis Carroll)’s discussion of multiple preferences the
book links forward to Kenneth Arrow whose ‘impossibility theorem’ defined the height of cold war thinking
about democracy.
Arrow took five allegedly neutral or non-controversial sparse conditions and proved mathematically that in a
society with multiple preferences there was no institutional choice mechanism that would allow us to arrive at
an agreed outcome consistent with all the five conditions. Szpiro does not tell this story very well, but rather
slides into the conventional public choice view (especially in America) of it, as a story of the necessary
imperfections of democracy.
This was a message that the US right has always been keen to stress and that went down a storm in the
Eisenhower years. Every democracy is imperfect, so we don’t need to improve ours – it’s the free market and
the American way that’s really valuable. Every democracy is imperfect – and so we are justified in imposing
flawed or questionable ‘democracies’ on subject peoples in our neo-colonies.
But what Arrow really says, if you read it carefully, is that every social choice mechanism (including allocation
by markets) is imperfect in realising social welfare or consensus, not just every voting mechanism. And what
are the five Arrow conditions that are allegedly so neutral? A key one is Pareto optimality which says (in
effect) that we can only improve the lot of the poorest person in society if we can find a way of doing so that
leaves Bill Gates or Rupert Murdoch with every one of their ill-gained, monopoly profit dollars. Can you spot
the bias in this condition? Should we be terribly concerned if we have to break it and make some well-off
folks a bit worse off in the cause of remedying egregious harms to others? But in Arrow’s formulation this is
as serious a breach as dictatorship.
Apart from this goofy maths view of Arrow, Szpiro’s account goes off course badly with the US founding
fathers who obsessed quite a bit about how to get exactly fair-sized constituencies for representatives,
especially for allocating seats in the House of Representatives fairly across the US states.  (The Senate was
easy – everyone gets two seats and proportionality can go hang!) The story here is that you cannot do this
apportionment task completely fairly, and that some high-end minor paradoxes and wrinkles remain in any
solution that you choose. Worth perhaps one chapter in this kind of book, Szpiro in fact gives it three long
ones, also introducing into his story some very low key maths/stats people – cake-splitters who have at best
footnote status in any sensible history of voting systems.
Meanwhile the obvious continuation of the story beyond Borda and Condorcet into west European
proportional representation systems and wider multi-preference systems for choosing representatives and
chief executives gets almost no coverage. You can see that some reviewer from an east coast US university
read the book for Princeton UP and said, “Great, but haven’t you missed out the Europeans?” So Szpiro
adds a rushed little chapter at the end (‘The Post-Moderns’) that is just terribly inadequate.
Thomas Hare gets a brief mention (but not John Stuart Mill or votes for women) and the single transferable
vote (STV) is terribly explained in a few lines. In general even here Szpiro’s focus is on one-vote, list PR
systems. It is almost as if (despite reviewing Borda, Condorcet, Dodgson and Arrow) he has never heard of
multi-preference voting systems, such as the Alternative Vote (AV) or Supplementary Vote (SV).
And this, of course, is because multi-preference voting is not now used in public elections in the USA, which
all the coverage of ‘apportionment’ problems seems designed to tell us is the most perfect democracy
feasible. Yet American professional associations do use sophisticated voting systems like STV. And many
Americans have agonised for years now about their increasingly three-way Presidential races that may easily
end up choosing the ‘wrong’ candidate in terms of multiple preferences.
At a city level too, some US mayors are elected on very low vote shares in multi-candidate fields. So the main
pro-reform movement in the USA focuses on what is there called ‘instant run-off’ elections (that is, AV or SV)
for the presidency, for state governors and city mayors, and for members of Congress and state legislatures.
Here are the issues that Borda and Condorcet (and before them many Catholic monks and nuns) discussed
so brilliantly, and their lively relevance for contemporary American politics is recently attested by discussions
of Szpiro’s book in the New Yorker.
What should be the central theme of Szpiro’s story is alive and is clearly just as relevant today as ever, not
least because the imperial power of our times still struggles along using a mediaeval vote-tallying method for
all its elections. So it is a great shame that after a burst of unjustified Arrovian pessimism from the cold war,
his initially brilliant story of democratic advances peters out in the mathematics of perfect cake-splitting.
Read the book with this caveat in mind though, and for two thirds of its length readers who are interested in
democracy, without being political scientists or mathematicians themselves, will get an acute introduction to
some fundamentals about how voting problems occur, and how some of them might be solved. It won’t tell
you anything at all about the Alternative Vote referendum in May 2011 under that name, but the Borda and
Condorcet chapters are highly relevant. Szpiro also will make you think apportionment problems are much
more important and chronic that they really are – for an antidote just watch the British state define 600
exactly equal constituencies in the UK in record time for 2014 or 2015.
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